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Medicare was established in 1965 under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act. It
was originally meant to eliminate the financial barriers to medical care for the aged.
It has been called a form of national health insurance for persons age 65 and over.
But it was deliberately designed in a manner to avoid modification of the fee-for-
services system that is the basis of American Medical Care (Estes, 1979). Asa result,
inflation in the cost of care has seriously reduced financial benefits to the
beneficiaries and in turn limited the access to medical care by the elderly.
Background
Medicare covers all elderly persons regardless of income. On the other hand,
Medicaid eligibility is determined by income, rather than age; low income persons
are covered by Medicaid. While Medicare requires co-insurance and deductible
payments by the beneficiary, Medicaid provides comprehensive coverage for health
care services for the poor. The need for (and dependency on) Medicare is most
pronounced among the low-income elderly who can least afford private health
insurance. Even with Medicare, however, older persons are required to pay part of
the costs for some services out of their own pockets.
As general health care costs increase, there are also increases in the share that
the older person must pay. Thus the older person is not entirely freed by Medicare
from the financial burdens of hospital and medical costs. To some extent, the
additional costs that are not covered by Medicare may be paid by Medicaid, where
available, in the state where the older person lives.
Medicaid is a public-welfare program for low-income persons of all ages.
However, the elderly poor are the primary users and beneficiaries of Medicaid (U.S.
DHEW, 1978). Moreover, Medicaid has been the fastest growing budgetary item in
state welfare programs smce 1975 (U.S. DHEW-OHDS, 1985).
The costs of Medicaid are paid with matching federal and state funds. Further,
Medicaid permits each state to determine its own eligibility requirements for
applicants who seek services through its programs. Generally, persons who are
eligible for benefits under Supplemental Social Insurance (SSI) and under Aid to
Families with dependent Children (AFDC) are also eligible for Medicaid (Coalition
on Women and the Budget, 1983). Of special importance to the elderly infirm is the
provision of unlimited nursing-home care without requiring previous
hospitalization (Kart, et al., 1978). The current mood against welfare for the poor in
the United States suggests that as poverty increases, or becomes protracted, as for
example, among members of the permanent underclass, the greater will be the
demands for "out-of-pocket" resources, and "third party liability." Third party
liability - primarily through private health insurance - is the major alternative to
Medicare and Medicaid for covering health care costs (HCFA, 1985).
Although, in 1981, the median income of elderly persons was high enough to
keep most of its members above the poverty level, many live below the poverty
level. And when the "near" poverty level is considered, some 30 percent live in
poverty or near poverty (Huttman, 1985). Among the black elderly, over one-third
live below the poverty level.
What this means is that, despite Medicare, a large segment of the elderly do
not have access to medical care or have no means to pay for it. Furthermore, it
cannot be assumed that Medicaid finances health care services for all of the poor.
Many elderly persons do not qualify for Medicaid because of various state eligibility
policies. For example, owning a home makes one ineligible for Medicaid. As a
result of the restrictions on Medicaid coverage, about 60 percent of the poor (of all
ages) are not covered by Medicaid (Davis and Rowland, 1986).
During the past four years, Medicare premiums, deductibles, co-payments, and
other fees to be paid by patients have increased. Ceilings have been imposed on
what doctors and hospitals can charge the government under Medicare, but in
many cases the excess charges have been passed on to the patient, or services have
been reduced. Today, nationwide, Medicare pays for about 49 percent of the total
health care costs of older citizens, and Medicaid pays about 1 3 percent. The rest is
paid out-of-pocket, either directly or through private insurance plans; those who
can not afford these costs may not go to the doctor or purchase prescribed
medicines
With the rapid rise in health care costs, Medicare protection is gradually being
eroded. In 1980, older Americans (65 and over) paid, on the average, $327 out of
their pockets for health care services. This figure, which includes insurance costs,
means that the elderly pay 18.5 percent of their medical care costs.
Medicare neither provides comprehensive coverage for all health care services
nor completely pays for those services it does cover. Cost-sharing mechanisms, such
as co-insurances and deductibles, reduce the benefit levels, such that only 74
percent of the total costs incurred for hospital care and 55 percent of costs for
physician services were paid by Medicare.
It is the near-poor elderly who bear the brunt of out-of-pocket costs, as the
elderly who were between 101 and 150 percent of the poverty level in 1980, paid
more out-of-pocket medical expenses ($391 .85) than any other poverty level
grouping. (See Figure 2).
Health and Medical Care of the Poor Elderly
Table 1 shows an analysis of the health and medical care characteristics of poor
and near-poor elderly. The data used in this analysis were derived from the 1977
National Medical Care Expenditure Survey (NMCES), which provided detailed
national estimates of the use of health services, health expenditures, and health
insurance coverage. This table examines the role of public insurance programs for
Figure 1
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the elderly whose incomes were less than 125% of the poverty line (Berk and
Wilensky, 1984).
For the purpose of this analysis these poor elderly were divided into three
groups. The first group consisted of the approximately 1 .4 million Medicare
beneficiaries who lacked private health insurance and did not receive Medicaid
assistance. The second group was the 1.5 million Medicare beneficiaries who also
had Medicaid but lacked any private coverage. The third group included over 3
million poor elderly who had private or other coverage to supplement their
government financed insurance.
Race. More than one-half of the poor elderly blacks (54.9%) have either
Medicare and no other insurance orthey qualify for Medicaid. And only 5.4 percent
of the blacks had private supplemental insurance.
Health Status . The population with both Medicare and Medicaid was in
poorer health than the population with private insurance or with Medicare only.
On the other hand, the Medicare only group and the private and other group did
not differ very much by health status.
Utilization . The medical care utilization data (physician visits) in Table 1
demonstrates that the absence of supplemental insurance such as Medicaid or
private coverage has a major impact on the use of Medical services by the poor
elderly since they do not have the resources to purchase services out of their
pockets. Those poor elderly with Medicare and Medicaid, who are the sickest, have
the largest mean number of physician visits per year. However, those who had
Medicare only had fewer visits than those with private or other insurance despite
the fact that they tend to be in slightly worse health.
Out-of Pocket Expenses . The elderly with Medicare and Medicaid coverage
but no private insurance -the poorest group -had a relatively low out-of-pocket
per capita expense; however, the next group on an SES scale would be those
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persons with Medicare only, who had an out-of-pocket expense level close to the
most "well-off" of these poor and near poor elderly. Undoubtedly, this contributed
to the low utilization rate of this group.
Table 2 shows the per capita spending and sources of funds for personal health
care expenditures for persons 65 years of age and older in 1984. Out of a total
average yearly expenditure of $4,202, two-thirds of the costs are paid by
government sources and one-third by private sources, mostly the beneficiary
(32.4%), as 25.2 percent was paid for medical care and 7.2 percent was spent for
insurance coverage.
Out-of-pocket Costs By Health Status and Income
In a recent experimental study on beneficiary-oriented cost containment we
analyzed out-of-pocket costs by health status and by income (Reed, 1988).
Methods
In this study actuarial calculations were used to provide estimates of future
average annual medical costs for persons not on Medicaid who are just turning 65
years of age, and an estimate of who would be the payers of those costs depending
on the actions of the individual in selecting insurance coverages and seeking out
medical care providers who accept Medicare assignment (Accepting assignment
means accepting the government's fee schedule). Medical care costs were restricted
to those services covered (at least in part) by Medicare plus prescription drugs.
A range of estimates was prepared depending on the recent medical history of
the individual. The average annual costs were taken to mean a weighted average
of costs in the next five years, the weights being the probability of survival to that
year times a discount factor for time value of money. Costs were adjusted for
inflation only to the extent that medical care costs are expected to exceed the
general inflation rate.
Table 2
Per capita spending and sources of funds for personal health
care expenditures for persons 65 years of age and older-1984.
Nursing
Hospital Physicians' Home Other
Payer Total Care Services Care Care
Total $4,202 $1,900 $868 $880 $554
Private 32.8 11.4 39.7 51.9 65.3
Consumer 32.4 11.0 39.6 51.2 64.8
Out-of-pocket 25.2 3.1 26.1 50.1 59.9
Insurance 7.2 7.9 13.5 1.1 4.9
Other 0.4 0.4 .0 0.7 0.5
Government 67.2 88.6 60.3 48.1 34.7
Medicare 48.8 74.8 57.8 2.1 19.9
Medicaid 12.8 4.8 1.9 41,5 11.4
Other 5.6 9.1 0.7 4.4 3.4
Source: U S. Health Care Financing Administration, Bureau of Data Management
and Strategy. HCFA Statistics. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1984, P.21
8
The resulting rates represent the average cost for all Medicare enrollees. They
were adjusted to reflect the average experience of non-institutional, non-welfare
Medicare eligibles age 65-69. Seven health statuses were defined based on an
individual's recent medical experience. The definitions were dictated largely by the
availability of a data base in which the future costs of a cohort could be followed
after a medical event. This data base is the Medicare History File which contains the
Medicare bills of 5% of eligibles for the years 1975 to 1978. Tabulations for these
estimates were prepared by the Bureau of Data Management and Strategy at the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA).
The tabulations divided the sample of eligibles into seven cohorts depending
on their medical experience in 1975. The seven cohorts were defined as follows:
(1) Those hospitalized for heart disease or neoplasms of certain internal
organs in 1975
(2) Those hospitalized for diabetes, arthropathy, or ulcers in 1975
(3) Those hospitalized with other diagnoses for over 20 days in 1975
(4) Those hospitalized with other diagnoses for 6-20 days in 1975
(5) Those hospitalized for less than 6 days in 1975
(6) Those not hospitalized in 1975, but with enough Medicare outpatient
expenses to meet the part B Deductible
(7) Those with no Medicare reimbursement in 1975 (i.e., those who had
medical expeditures less than the $75 deductible)
The per capita Medicare reimbursement was calculated for each of those seven
cohorts and for the total of all seven in 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978.
The average annual cost as just described for each of the seven health status
cohorts was then divided among four payers: Medicare, self, private insurer
supplementing Medicare, and physicians' foregone fees when assignment is
accepted. The division of such costs depends on the choices of the beneficiary of
which supplemental insurances to buy and whether or not to seek out physicians
who accept assignment.
Findings
Seven options are illustrated in this table which shows the average expected
distribution of costs for a male in our best broad health status group:
1
.
Medicare Part A only (beneficiary refuses Part B)
2. Medicare Parts A and B only
3. Medicare A & B and use a primary physician who takes assignment
4. Medicare A & B and use all physicians who take assignment
5. Medicare A & B and a typical HMO option
6. Medicare A & B and a typical Medigap policy
7. Medicare A & B, a typical Medigap policy and use of only physicians who
take assignment.
For background, Tables 3 and 4 are provided. They show the expected out-of-
pocket cost calculations (in 1986 dollars) of a sample of new Medicare enrollees in
the Rochester, New York area. Table 3 shows these distributions for a male in the
best health status category (no hospitalization, 3 or fewer physician visits). Table 4
shows the expected distribution of costs by payer for a female in the worst health
status (a perosn hospitalized for heart disease or neoplasms of certain internal
organs), Table 5 shows the out-of-pocket costs by health status organized into three
broad groupings: poor health, fair health, and good health. In addition to the
great differences in out-of-pocket payments by health status there are also great
differences by provider practice and insurance coverage.
Of particular interest here is the distribution of the elderly in this cost
breakdown. The bottom of Table 5 shows that of this sample of 800 new Medicare
enrollees some 88 percent had HMO or private supplemental insurance, a
proportion that is higher than the average of all persons over 65 years of age.
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On the other hand there were still 12 percent who did not have supplemental
insurance and 9 percent who had only Part A of Medicare - which means they would
be expected to pay, on the average, between $840 and $2,253 out of their pockets
for health care depending on their health condition.
Table 6 shows the out-of-pocket costs by sex and income for a specific health
status category - health status 6, a "fair" health status: persons not hospitalized,
but with more than three physician visits, during the preceding year. Over 6 percent
of these persons had no Part B coverage, no supplemental insurance, physicians who
did not accept assignment, and the potential liability of $1,600 or $1,300 out-of-
pocket costs per year for males and females, respectively. And few of them could
afford such costs.
Conclusion
What these data indicate are quite simply the fact that we have a policy that
does not fit the need - or the promise. Despite the originally expressed intentions
of the medicare program, the acquisition of medical care is still a function of
personal finances.
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